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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the phenomenon of a shift of the bur-
den of proof in legal persuasion dialogues. Some sample
dialogues are analysed of types of situations where such a
shift may occur, viz. reasoning with defeasible rules, reason-
ing with argumentation schemes and reasoning with mere
presumptions. It is argued that whether a shift in the bur-
den of proof occurs can itself become the subject of dispute
and it is shown how a dialogue game protocol for persuasion
can be extended to let it regulate persuasion dialogues about
the burden of proof. It is also shown that dialogues about
the burden of proof are often implicitly about the precise
form of the rules used in an argument.
1. INTRODUCTION
One subfield of AI & Law is the formal study of dialogue sys-
tems for argumentation [5, 9, 8, 2, 13, 3]. Formal systems
have been designed that regulate the exchange of arguments
and counterarguments and expression of propositional atti-
tudes towards their premises and conclusions (such as claim-
ing, disputing, conceding or retracting them). This field is a
further development of so-called ‘formal dialectics’, a field of
philosophical logic and argumentation theory [10, 22], which
aims to formalise principles of coherent dialogue. A main as-
sumption of formal dialectics is that coherence depends on
the goal of a dialogue and that different types of dialogue
have different goals. AI & Law has been especially con-
cerned with so-called ‘persuasion dialogue’, which aims at
fair and effective resolution of a conflict of opinion.
This paper1 studies the role of burden of proof in legal
persuasion dialogues. In other research, the burden of proof
is usually hardwired into the protocol. For example, [8]
uses the following rule: “whoever advances a standpoint is
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obliged to defend it if asked to do so”. This rule is also im-
plicit in the dialogue systems of [10, 5, 2] and [22]. However,
in the law the allocation of the burden of proof can become
a legal issue and therefore a dialogue may shift into a met-
alevel dialogue on who has the burden of proof (see also
[7]). To account for this phenomenon, we propose a formal
dialogue system for persuasion dialogues in which two op-
posing parties can argue about who has the burden of proof
for a certain claim. In [13] a dialogue game was proposed
for three-party disputes where a referee has the authority
to distribute the burden of proof for specific assertions over
the adversaries. However, in that game allocations of the
burden of proof could not be disputed. To our knowledge,
the present paper is the first to address the modelling of
two-party persuasion dialogues about the burden of proof.
It is not our aim to model actual legal procedures but
to formulate rational principles of coherent dialogue about
burden of proof. The resulting theory can be used in several
ways, for instance, for rationally reconstructing legal dis-
putes, for assessing the quality of legal procedures or for de-
signing interaction protocols for intelligent software agents.
This paper is organised as follows. We first introduce a
distinction between global and local burden of proof. Then
we semi-formally analyse three types of cases which give rise
to disputes about the burden of proof, viz. the use of defea-
sible rules, the use of argumentation schemes and the use
of legal presumptions. We then propose a formal dialogue
game for dialogues in which the burden of proof can be ar-
gued about and we illustrate it with some examples.
2. GLOBAL AND LOCAL BURDEN OF PROOF
Burden of proof is important at the global level of a dialogue
as well as at the local level. In persuasion dialogues there
are two participants, called the proponent and the opponent .
There are two subcases. In the dispute, the proponent has
proposition A as her designated thesis. Her goal is to prove
A, while the opponent’s goal is to prove the opposite of A.
Thus each has a burden of proof. In the dissent , the pro-
ponent’s goal is to prove A, while the goal of the opponent
is merely to show that the proponent’s attempt is not suc-
cessful. Thus in a dissent, the proponent has a burden of
proof, but the opponent does not. We think that legal dis-
putes usually are of the dissent type and therefore we will
in this paper exclusively focus on this type of persuasion
dialogue. In a dissent, proponent will have what is called in
law an ultimate probandum, which constitutes proponent’s
global burden of proof and which pertains to a participant’s
ultimate goal in a dialogue.
While the global burden of proof is fixed during a dia-
logue, at the local level the burden of proof may change.
Moves in which a proposition is asserted (either as a claim
or as a premise of an argument) usually carry a burden with
them to defend the assertion or else retract it when chal-
lenged. However, in exceptional cases the burden shifts to
the other party to provide evidence that the proposition
does not hold. This happens, for instance, in legal disputes
when a legal presumption is invoked as a premise of an argu-
ment put forward to meet the global burden of proof. Then
the local burden of proof with respect to the presumption
shifts to the other party. For example, if in a civil case
plaintiff provides evidence in the form of an affidavit, then
according to Dutch civil procedure the content of the af-
fidavit is presumed true unless the defendant proves it is
false. So the local burden of proof with respect to the claim
that the content of the affidavit is false is on the defendant.
The same happens with legally recognised exceptions to le-
gal rules. For instance, if the plaintiff in a civil case claims
that a contract exists between him and defendant, plaintiff
has the burden of proving that an offer was made and ac-
cepted. Once plaintiff has proven this, the local burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to prove, for instance, that the
offeree was insane when accepting the offer.
3. TYPES OF SITUATIONS WITH SHIFTS
IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
We next discuss three types of cases in which shifts of the
local burden of proof may arise, viz. the use of defeasible
rules, of argumentation schemes and of mere presumptions.
3.1 Dialogues with defeasible rules
It is commonly accepted in AI & Law that the rules invoked
by legal arguments are often defeasible. This both holds for
‘official’ legal rules, such as statutory rules, and for ‘unoffi-
cial’ rules, such as rules on subsuming a case under a legal
concept (interpretation rules) or on when a certain piece
of evidence proves a certain claim (evidential rules). With
statutory rules it is usually clear when a shift in the bur-
den of proof occurs (although even here disputes about the
burden of proof may arise). However, with interpretation
and evidential rules it is often less clear what is a normal
condition and what is an exception, especially since these
rules are often left implicit in legal arguments, so that their
precise formulation is not always apparent.
In reasoning about evidence this situation especially arises
with the empirical generalisations needed to ‘glue’ evidence
and probandum together. Consider again our contract ex-
ample and assume that plaintiff proves the existence of an
offer and acceptance with two witness testimonies. Then he
has in mind the following generalisation
(1) If two witnesses say that P then usually P is
the case
Suppose now there is reason to think the witnesses may have
conferred. Defendant could then respond in two ways. The
first is by saying
“But the witnesses conferred, so your evidence
does not prove your claim”.
Arguably, defendant thus agrees that two witnesses usually
speak the truth but argues that there is an exception to this
rule in case the witnesses conferred, namely:
(2) If two witnesses say that P and they conferred,
then it is not so that usually P is the case
However, an alternative attack of defendant is to say
“but how do you know that the witnesses did not
confer?”.
Thus defendant question reveals that she thinks plaintiff’s
generalisation should have an additional condition ‘and the
witnesses did not confer’:
(1’) If two witnesses say that P and they did not
confer, then usually P is the case
As for the burden of proof the crucial difference between (1)
and (1’) is that if (1) is the correct evidential rule then defen-
dant must prove that the witnesses conferred while if (1’) is
the correct rule then plaintiff must prove that the witnesses
did not confer. In [3] defendant’s second reply was identified
as one of two ways (“refining” and “unpacking”) in which
in dialogues about evidence a generalisation can be gradu-
ally reshaped in a process of critical examination, so that
a higher-quality theory of a legal case may result. Here we
are instead concerned with how disputes about the precise
form of generalisations affect issues of burden of proof.
An example with an interpretation rule is a Dutch Supreme
Court decision in a labour dispute (HR 19 September 1980,
NJ 1981, 131). A music band called Los Gatos was hired to
work at a cruise ship of the Holland-America Line (HAL).
At some point the manager told the band to perform for
the crew while the ship was waiting for repair in a harbour
without passengers. The band refused to play, after which
they were immediately dismissed. According to Dutch law
such a dismissal is valid if and only if there was a “pressing
ground” for dismissal. One such pressing ground is when
the employee persistently refuses to obey reasonable orders
of the employer (Section 1639p,10 Dutch Civil Code). Los
Gatos sued HAL on the ground that this pressing ground
would not apply to their case. Their main argument was
that the HAL managers had not wanted to listen to to the
reason why the band had refused to play. This fact was not
disputed. What was disputed is how much had to be proven
by Los Gatos to claim that in their case their refusal to obey
the orders of HAL was not a pressing ground for dismissal.
In particular, the dispute revolved around the issue whether
Los Gatos had to prove that they had a good reason to
refuse to play or that HAL had to prove the opposite. The
Supreme Court decided that HAL had the burden of proof
since its managers had made it impossible for Los Gatos to
explain their reasons for not wanting to play. Arguably, the
underlying dispute was whether the interpretation rule is
(3) If employees were not heard then refusal of work
is not a pressing ground for dismissal.
(with an exception for when the employees had no good
reason for their refusal), or
(3’) If employees were not heard and they had a good
reason to refuse work, then refusal of work is not
a pressing ground for dismissal.
It is important to note that, although the dispute can be
reconstructed in terms of the underlying (implicit) general-
isations, the dispute as it took place was about the burden
of proof of certain specific facts and did not mention any
general interpretation or evidence rule.2
3.2 Dialogues with argumentation schemes
Arguments are often constructed according to argumenta-
tion schemes, which are stereotypical patterns of arguments.
Such schemes are a crucial concept of argumentation theory
and they have recently been studied in AI & law [6, 21, 17,
4]. As studied by [19], they technically have the form of an
inference rule. However, they are not based on the mean-
ing of logical operators, but on epistemological principles or
principles of practical reasoning. Argumentation schemes
come with a set of critical questions which, when asked,
have to be answered before the scheme can be applied.
For present purposes the main issue is how asking a crit-
ical question influences the burden of proof. Suppose an
argument instantiating some scheme has been put forward
and a critical question matching the scheme for that argu-
ment has been asked. Does merely asking the question make
the argument default so that the other party has to answer
the question positively, or is the burden on the questioner to
provide evidence that the answer is negative? We take the
view that the answer to this question depends on domain-
specific issues and can become the subject of debate.
To provide a focus for the investigation, we consider the
argumentation scheme from expert opinion. As proposed in
[20, p. 258], it takes the following form (where A is a propo-
sition, E is an expert, and D is a domain of knowledge).
Scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion
E is an expert in domain D
E asserts that A is known to be true
A is within D
Therefore, A may plausibly be taken to be true
The premises in the scheme together warrant drawing a rea-
sonable inference to the conclusion. Argument from expert
opinion is, however, a defeasible form of argument that holds
on a presumptive basis, subject to the asking of appropri-
ate critical questions by the other party in a dialogue. The
opponent can ask any of the following six critical questions:.
Critical Questions Matching Argument from Ex-
pert Opinion
1. Expertise Question: How credible (knowl-
edgeable) is E as an expert source?
2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field
that A is in?
3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that
implies A?
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally
reliable as a source, e.g. is E biased?
5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with
what other experts assert?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is A’s assertion
based on evidence?
2At least not as far as the published Supreme-Court decision
reveals the dispute.
A question of current interest is whether these critical ques-
tions should be seen as implicit premises of an argument
from expert opinion or as implicit exceptions to the argu-
ment. Let us look at them, one at a time. 1: when you put
forward an appeal to expert opinion, you assume, as part of
the argument, that the source is credible, or has knowledge
in some field. 2: you assume that the expert is an expert
in the field of the claim made. 3: you assume that the ex-
pert said something from which the claim can be extracted
by inference or direct quoting. 6: you assume that the ex-
pert’s assertion was based on some evidence within the field
of his/her expertise. The argument does not make much
sense without these assumptions being part of it. 4 and 5
seem to be a little different. If the expert is claimed to be
biased, or to be dishonest, then if there is evidence for such
claims, that attacks the argument. But to mount such an
attack, it looks like the critic should have to produce some
fairly substantial evidence. If the claim can be shown not
to be consistent with what other experts in the same field
say, then that is an argument against the claim. But that
needs to be shown by telling us what the other experts have
in fact said, and showing how these statements conflict with
what our expert said.
So critical questions 4 and 5 seem to have a positive bur-
den of proof attached, while the remaining critical questions
do not. Once asked, the latter questions must be given an
appropriate answer or the original argument is refuted. Ask-
ing 4 and 5 is a harder task, if you want the question to get
the original argument to default. Merely asking the ques-
tions is not enough; evidence has to be provided that, if
accepted by the fact finder, gives rise to a counterargument
that defeats the argument from expert opinion. Thus there
are two possible roles for critical questions. Questions like
1,2,3 and 6 serve to locate missing premises that can be
questioned. Questions like 4 and 5, by contrast, serve to
seek out points of possible attack in an argument, which
can be followed up or not, depending on what is available as
evidence in the case. In conclusion, some critical questions
seem to shift a burden of proof, some do not.
However, a further issue arises: is the fact that a par-
ticular critical question shifts a burden of proof context-
dependent or not? There is a Gricean default, perhaps (e.g.
Expert Opinion - usually, there is presumption for the hon-
esty of the expert), but it can be overridden by particular
circumstances. Accordingly, the dialogue protocol should
prevent the infinite regress past ‘Why A?; why not A?’, by
recognising that the argument has shifted to an embedded
persuasion dialogue on who has the burden of proof. Individ-
ual agents will have defaults covering application of burden
of proof rules. Discrepancies in these rules, or unilateral be-
lief in exceptions to agreed-upon, common rules, could both
give rise to embedded burden of proof meta-dialogues.
Let us illustrate these points with a small schematic dia-
logue, between a proponent P and an opponent O.
P1: C since E says that C (Argument from Expert
Opinion)
O2: Is E unbiased? (critical question ¬B?)
P3: You think he is biased? (B?)
O4: Er, no.
At P1, P states the main argument for his claim, using the
argumentation scheme from Expert Opinion (leaving two
of its premises implicit). With O2, O implicitly takes on
a propositional commitment to the effect that P has the
burden of proof with respect to B. Thus O regards ‘E is
unbiased’ as a third implicit premise of the scheme from
Expert Opinion. At the next step, P implicitly takes on a
commitment that it is O that has the burden of proving ¬B,
thus rejecting O’s interpretation of the scheme from Expert
Opinion. The locution O4 simply concedes and thus stops
any opportunity for a burden of proof dialogue.
An alternative completion is O4′ :
O4′ : Yes, because E has an investment in C
So again, there is no disagreement about the burden of proof,
but this time, O substantiates his challenge. Note that in
both dialogues there is an separate, implicit dialogue being
conducted concurrently about the burden of proof.
But one further possible completion is O4′′ :
O4′′ : Isn’t it for you to show that he’s not?
This is a move to an explicit dialogue about who has the
burden of proof with respect to B.
The following pictures illustrate how these dialogues dy-
namically construct and reshape a dialectical theory of the
case and thereby illustrate how the (implicit) burden of
proof dialogue is related to an (also implicit) dialogue about
the precise form of the argument scheme from Expert Opin-
ion. The first two theories both consist of a single argument,
displayed as inference trees with the conclusion at the top
and where each vertical link represents an application of an
inference rule. The final theory also contains the beginning
of a counterargument; the (undercutting) defeat relation be-
tween the two arguments is displayed with a horizontal link
between their conclusions. Figure 1 displays the theory af-
Figure 1: The theory after P1.
ter move P1. With O2, opponent tries to reshape the theory
by arguing that the argument has a second premise (Fig-
ure 2). With move P3, proponent disagrees with opponent’s
reshaping and instead regards ‘E is biased’ as an exception
which, if proven by opponent, defeats his original argument.
Together, these pictures illustrate that for argumentation
schemes the same holds as for defeasible rules: when their
use leads to a dispute about the burden of proof, this dis-
pute can be interpreted as a dispute about the precise form
of the rule or scheme. Accordingly, we will in the remainder
of the paper treat both categories in the same way.
3.3 Dialogues with mere presumptions
Sometimes issues of burden of proof do not concern a de-
feasible rule or scheme but a particular statement. The is-
sue then is whether that statement must be presumed true
Figure 2: The theory after O2.
Figure 3: The theory after P3.
or false. A recent American example is the case Weast v.
Schaffer, 41 IDELR 176 (4th Cir. 2004) where parents of a
special education student sued the school district to seek re-
imbursement for private school tuition on the grounds that
the individualised education programme (IEP) for their son
provided by the district was inappropriate. Even though
the parents explicitly stated that the IEP was inappropri-
ate, they claimed that the district had the burden of proving
that it was inappropriate. A district court agreed with the
parents but in appeal the majority of the 4th US circuit
Court of Appeals held that the parents had the burden of
proving that the IEP was inappropriate, since deciding oth-
erwise would violate the policy of the relevant law to rely
on the professional expertise of the local educators. The
dissent instead argued that the burden should be on the
district since they were obliged to provide an education pro-
gramme to students and they had an inherent advantage
over the parents in assessing the feasibility and likely ben-
efit of alternative educational arrangements. This example
illustrates that sometimes a party explicitly makes a claim
but the burden of proof can still be on the party who dis-
putes the claim (even though in this case it was ultimately
decided otherwise).
4. A PROTOCOL FOR BURDEN-OF-PROOF
DIALOGUES
In this section we formalise a protocol for the embedding
of burden-of-proof (BoP) dialogues in ’conventional’ per-
suasion dialogues of the dissent type. The protocol will be
formulated as a formal dialogue game, as an instance of the
framework of [12, 14]. Dialogue games have a topic language
Lt with a logic L, and a communication language Lc with
a protocol P . Dialogue games also have commitment rules,
which specify the effects of an utterance from Lc on the
propositional commitments of the dialogue participants. In
persuasion dialogues of the dissent type a proponent and an
Table 1: Speech acts and replies in Lc (1).
Acts Attacks Surrenders
claim p why p concede p
p since Q why qi(qi ∈ Q) concede qi
(qi ∈ Q)
q since Q′ concede p
(q since Q′ defeats p since Q)
why p p since Q, retract p
why −p
concede p
retract p
opponent argue about a single dialogue topic t ∈ Lt. Propo-
nent aims to make opponent concede t while opponent aims
to make proponent give up t.
We present the protocol in two stages. First we present
a basic persuasion protocol in which the burden of proof
is hardwired (Section 4.2). This is in fact a revised and
simplified version of the two-player protocols presented in
[12, 13]. Then we extend the basic protocol to let it regulate
dialogues about the burden of proof (Section 4.3). But first
we briefly describe the underlying logic of both protocols.
4.1 The underlying logic
Since our main concern is not inference but dialogue, we
only make some minimal assumptions on the topic language
and its logic. The topic language Lt is assumed to be a
logical language closed under classical negation ¬. As for
notation, −p denotes the converse of p: the converse of p is
¬p and the converse of ¬p is p (where ¬ is classical negation).
As in [4, 3], the logic L is assumed to be an argument-
based logic in the style of [11, 18], in which arguments can
be constructed by chaining inference rules into trees. For
any argument A, the sets prem(A) and conc(A) denote the
premises, respectively conclusion of A. Inference rules are
of two kinds, the strict rules S, consisting of all deductively
valid inference rules and the defeasible rules D. Arguments
can be defeated in three ways: with an argument for the
negation of a premise (premise defeat), with an argument
for a contradictory conclusion (rebutting defeat) or with an
argument that a defeasible inference rule cannot be applied
in a certain case (undercutting defeat). These notions of
defeat can be refined with notions of argument strength,
but to keep things simple we disregard strength below.
4.2 A basic protocol for persuasion dialogue
We now present a dialogue game protocol for persuasion di-
alogues with hardwired burden of proof. The game is based
on the following ideas. Each dialogue move except the ini-
tial one replies to one earlier move of the other party in the
dialogue (its target). Thus a dialogue can be regarded in
two ways: as a sequence (reflecting the order in which the
moves are made) and as a tree (reflecting the reply relations
between the moves). Each replying move is either an at-
tacker or a surrender . For instance, a claim p move can be
attacked with a why p move and surrendered with a con-
cede p move. And a why p move can be attacked with a p
since Q move and surrendered with a retract p move. The
communication language Lc is specified in Table 1. In
this table, p, q, qi and the elements from Q and Q
′ are from
Lt. Furthermore, since moves express an argument A con-
structible in L. Finally, defeat relations between arguments
are determined according to L.
The protocol for Lc is defined in terms of the notion of a
dialogue, which in turn refers to the notion of a move:
Definition 4.1.
• The set M of moves is defined as N×{P,O}×Lc×N,
where the four elements of a move m are denoted by,
respectively:
– id(m), the identifier of the move,
– pl(m), the player of the move,
– s(m), the content of the move,
– t(m), the target of the move.
• The set of dialogues, denoted by M≤∞, is the set of all
sequences m1, . . . ,mi, . . . from M such that
– each ith element in the sequence has identifier i,
– t(m1) = 0;
– for all i > 1 it holds that t(mi) = j for some mj
preceding mi in the sequence.
The set of finite dialogues, denoted by M<∞, is the
set of all finite sequences that satisfy these conditions.
For any dialogue d = m1, . . . ,mn, . . ., the sequence
m1, . . . ,mi is denoted by di, where d0 denotes the empty
dialogue.
When t(m) = id(m′) we say that m replies to m′ in d and
also that m′ is the target of m in d. We will sometimes
slightly abuse notation and let t(m) denote a move instead
of just its identifier. When s(m) is an attacking (surrender-
ing) reply to s(m′) we will also say that m is an attacking
(surrendering) reply to m′.
The semantics for Lc is defined in axiomatic style as a set
of precondition-postcondition rules. In fact, as we will see
below, the only precondition for each move is that it is legal
according to the protocol.3
Definition 4.2. A protocol on M is a function P with
domain a nonempty subset of M<∞ taking subsets of M
as values. The elements of dom(P ) (the domain of P ) are
called the legal finite dialogues. The elements of P (d) are
called the moves allowed after d. If d is a legal dialogue and
P (d) = ∅, then d is said to be a terminated dialogue.
Furthermore, for all moves m it holds that m ∈ P (d) if
and only if m satisfies all of the following conditions:
• R1: pl(m) ∈ T (d);4
• R2: If d 6= d0 and m 6= m1, then s(m) is a reply to
s(t(m)) according to Lc;
• R3: If m replies to m′, then pl(m) 6= pl(m′);
• R4: If there is an m′ in d such that t(m) = t(m′) then
s(m) 6= s(m′).
• R5: If d = d0, then s(m) is of the form claim p.
• R6: If m is a replying move, then m is relevant in d.
3The first part of this definition is adapted from [1].
4T (d) denotes the player whose turn it is to move in d.
R1 says that the player of a move must be to move. R2-R4
formalise the idea of a dialogue as a move-reply structure
that allows for alternative replies. R5 says that each dia-
logue begins with a claim; the initial claim is the topic of
the dialogue. Finally, R6 says that each replying move must
be relevant in a structural sense to be explained below.
These rules are the minimal conditions for legality of a
move. Further legality conditions could be defined, such as
for respecting one’s commitments (see e.g. [22]) or for pre-
venting circular dialogues (see e.g. [10]). However, to keep
the protocol simple, we will below only add rules that are
essential for regulating the embedding of BoP subdialogues
in a persuasion dialogue.
Relevance is defined in terms of the dialogical status of a
move, which in turn is recursively defined in terms of the
nature of its replies. A move is in iff it is surrendered or else
if all its attacking replies are out. (This implies that a move
without replies is in). And a move is out if it has an at-
tacking reply that is in. Furthermore, a move is definitely in
(out) if it is in (out) and its status cannot change any more.
Finally, a move is surrendered if it is a p since Q move and it
has a reply concede p or else if it has any surrendering reply.
With this concept of dialogical status a structural notion of
relevance can be defined. A move is relevant if it replies to
a relevant target. And a move is a relevant target if mak-
ing it out changes the dialogical status of the initial move
of the dialogue. Together with Definition 4.2 these defini-
tions imply that a move is a relevant target for proponent
(opponent) if making it out makes the initial move in (out).
Accordingly we say that P currently wins d if m1 is in and
O currently wins if m1 is out.
Figure 4 (with only attacking replies) illustrates the no-
tion of relevance. A move labelled + is in and a move la-
P1+
O2-
P3-
O4- O6+
P5+
O8
relevant
not relevant
O8’
P7+
Figure 4: Dialogical status of moves
belled − is out. P5 is not a relevant target for O: although
making P5 out makes O4 in, P3 was already out because
of O6 and therefore O2 stays out because of P7, so that P1
stays in. However, P7 is a relevant target for O: making P7
out makes O2 in since its only attacking reply is now out;
then P1 is out since it now has an attacking reply that is in.
The requirement that each move be relevant allows the
players maximal freedom on issues such as backtracking and
postponing replies while yet ensuring a strong focus of a
dispute. It should be noted that our notion of relevance is
structural, defined in terms of the reply structure of a dia-
logue. Our notion says nothing about substantial relevance
or arguments. For instance, an argument “The suspect is
guilty since the moon is made of green cheese” may very
well be structurally relevant in our sense. Its substantial
irrelevance should be argued for in the dialogue with an un-
dercutting counterargument or a why attack.
The requirement of relevance comes with a turntaking
rule T that the turn switches as soon as a player has changed
the dialogical status of the initial move (below pl is a vari-
able ranging over {P,O} and p denotes O if pl = P and P
if pl = O). Formally, T is a function
• T :M<∞ −→ {P,O}
such that T (d0) = P and if d 6= d0 then T (d) = pl iff pl
currently wins d.
The rationale of this rule is that as soon as a player has
changed the dialogical status ofm1, he has no relevant moves
any more so to avoid premature termination the turn should
shift to the other party.
The commitment rules are defined as a function of the
following type:
• C: {P,O} ×M<∞ −→ P(Lt).
Cp(d) denotes the commitments of player p in the dialogue
d. The following commitment rules for Lc seem uncontro-
versial and can be found throughout the literature. (Below s
denotes the speaker of the move; effects on the other parties’
commitments are only specified when a change is effected;
finally, d,m stands for the dialogue starting with dialogue d
and continuing with move m.)
• If s(m) = claim p then Cs(d,m) = Cs(d) ∪ {p}
• If s(m) = why p then Cs(d,m) = Cs(d)
• If s(m) = concede p then Cs(d,m) = Cs(d) ∪ {p}
• If s(m) = retract p then Cs(d,m) = Cs(d)/{p}
• If s(m) = p since Q then Cs(d,m) = Cs(d) ∪Q ∪ {p}
The axiomatic semantics of the system then is as fol-
lows: for each move m and dialogue d:
precondition: m ∈ P (d)
postcondition: as specified by Cs(d,m).
To give a feel for how dialogues evolve in this system, we
now list a few properties of the system (cf. [14]). Firstly, a
turn of a player always consists of zero or more surrenders
followed by a single attack. Further, the turn shifts to the
opponent if the initial move is made in while it shifts to
the proponent if the initial move is made out. A dialogue
terminates only if the status of the initial move is against
the player to move (out for the proponent and in for the
opponent). So if a dialogue terminates when player pl is to
move, pl can be said to have lost the dialogue. Moreover,
it can be shown that a dialogue terminates if and only if
either proponent has surrendered to opponent’s first move
by retracting the dialogue topic or opponent has surrendered
to proponent’s first move by conceding the dialogue topic.
4.3 Extending the protocol for BoP dialogues
We now extend our protocol to let it regulate dialogues
about the burden of proof. First we make some further
assumptions about the topic language Lt. It is now de-
fined as L0 ∪ L1, where L0 is some propositional or first-
order language and L1 consists of all formulas of the form
Table 2: Speech acts and replies in Lc (2).
Acts Attacks Surrenders
claim p why p concede p
p sinceA Q why qi(qi ∈ Q ∪A) concede qi
(qi ∈ Q ∪A)
q sinceA Q
′ concede p
(q sincecA Q
′ defeats
p sincecA′ Q)
why p p sinceA Q, retract p
why −p,
BoP (−p) since R
concede p
retract p
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ such that ϕi, ϕ ∈ L0. Formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒
ϕ informally read as “if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn then normally ϕ”. There
is just one defeasible inference rule, viz. modus ponens for
⇒. Furthermore, we make the notion of undercutting more
precise as follows. For each ϕ ∈ L1 we define a function c(ϕ),
returning a set S ∈ L0 (the critical questions of ϕ). The set
ass(B) of assumptions of an argument B then consists of
all critical questions of any L1-premise of B. Below we will
denote the assumptions of an argument with a subscript A
of since (dropping the subscript when there is no danger for
confusion). An undercutter of B then is any argument that
concludes to the negation of an assumption of B.
We also want to account for the fact that arguments of-
ten leave their general rules implicit. For present purposes
this is very important since, as we have seen in Section 3,
burden-of-proof dialogues are often about the precise form
of the rules implicit in an argument. In some other systems
(e.g. [22]) an incomplete argument commits the speaker to a
material implication premises → conclusion. However, for
defeasible arguments this is not appropriate while, more-
over, usually it is clear from the dialogue context what is
left implicit. To respect these observations, we assume that
each dialogue has a context C ⊆ Lt. We next refine the def-
inition of since moves in Lc as follows. For each p since Q
move it now holds that
1. p since Q is constructible in L; or else
2. there is a r = Q⇒ p in C such that p since Q ∪ {r} is
constructible in L.
Note that case (2) implies that the other premises are all
from L0. We next refine the notions ass(A) and prem(A)
for arguments that satisfy (2), by including c(r) in ass(A)
and r in prem(A). Thus it becomes possible to challenge or
concede implicit premises of an argument. Also, we refine
the commitment rules by including r in Cs(d,m) if m moves
an argument that satisfies case (2). Finally, whenever we
need to refer to the completed version of an argument, we
denote it with sincec (see Table 2).
Next we extend Lc with two new replies to why p moves,
viz. why −p and BoP (−p) since R, and with a why p reply to
a since move for each assumption p of the moved argument.
Table 2 displays the communication language resulting from
the changes made so far. In this table, p, q, qi are from L0
and the elements from Q and Q′ are from L0 ∪ L1. Note
that formulas of the form BoP (p) are propositional atoms
with some syntactic sugar so that a BoP (p) since Q move
can be replied to as any other since move.
As for the new protocol rules, they include rules (R1−R6)
above. What remains is to regulate the embedding of BoP
dialogues in other dialogues (possibly also BoP dialogues).
First we add three obvious rules.
• R7: if s(m) = BoP (p) since Q, then p is not the dia-
logue topic.
• R8: If m is a why reply to a why move m′, then t(m′)
is not a why move.
• R9: If m is a why reply to a why move m′, then m′
has not yet been replied to.
R7 makes the players respect that the global burden of proof
remains fixed during a dialogue. R8 avoids an infinite regress
“why?, why not?, why?, . . . ”. Finally, R9 avoids that a
player first meets a why attack with an argument and then
challenges that he has the burden of proof.
Next, in order to ensure orderly and well-structured di-
alogues, we want that each BoP dialogue is completed be-
fore a participant may jump back to a surrounding dialogue.
This can be achieved by assigning to each move a dialogue
level and requiring that a target of a move is of the highest
possible level. (Below we say that a level l is higher than a
level l′ if l > l′; the symbols <,= and 6= are defined as usual
for natural numbers). The level of a move in a dialogue
m1, . . . ,mn is defined as follows:
• level(m1) = 1
• level(mi+1) =
– 1+ level(t(mi+1)) if mi+1 is a BoP (p) since Q
reply to a why −p move;
– level(t(mi+1)) otherwise.
Now we add to the above protocol conditions (R1−R9) the
following final condition:
• R10: There is no m′ 6= m that satisfies protocol rules
R1 −R9 and such that level(t(m)) < level(t(m′)).
Taken together, our protocol rules imply that a jump back
to a lower level is legal only if the current BoP dialogue is
’terminated’, that is if the move that started the current
BoP dialogue has obtained a definitive status. To see this,
observe that otherwise there are still legal moves that can
change its status and so by R10 no reply to a higher-level
target is legal. Also, our protocol implies that a jump to a
lower level that is not equal to level 1 will always be to the
immediately preceding surrounding dialogue.
To illustrate this with a schematic example, suppose that
a legal dialogue starts with a sequencem1, . . . ,m3 at level 1,
then jumps to level 2 atm4, . . . ,m9, then jumps back to level
1 at m10, . . . ,m17, then jumps to level 2 at m18, . . . ,m23,
and jumps higher to level 3 at m24, . . . ,m27. Our protocol
implies that the BoP subdialoguem4, . . . ,m9 is ’terminated’
at m9 by making m4 definitely in or out, so it contains no
relevant targets for subsequent moves. This implies that
if m24, . . . ,m27 ’terminates’ at m27, then the only relevant
targets for m28 that are of level 2 are in m18, . . . ,m23. Note,
however, that this phenomenon does not hold for moves that
jump back to level 1: suppose that m28, . . . ,m32 continues
m18, . . . ,m23 at level 2 and m33 ’terminates’ this BoP dia-
logue; then m34 may reply to any level-1-move in the dia-
logue that is a relevant target, even to m1 (by conceding or
retracting its claim), since the level-1-dialogue is not termi-
nated until the claim of m1 is conceded or retracted.
5. EXAMPLE DIALOGUES
In this section we illustrate the protocol with the exam-
ples of Section 3. The target of a move is given between
square brackets. Below each move the dialogical status of
some moves of interest is listed. To avoid too much formal
detail, the logical form of propositions is sometimes infor-
mally paraphrased and we treat BoP (p) and BoP (−p) as
contradictory propositions. Also, for ease of readability the
relevant player is added to BoP expressions.
5.1 A dialogue with an argumentation scheme
To begin with, we illustrate the use of an argumentation
scheme with the schematic example from Section 3.2.
P1: claim C
- P1 is in
O2[P1]: why C
- P1 is out, O2 is in
P3[O2]: C since E says so and E is an expert about C
- O2 is out, P1 is in
O4[P3]: why ¬E biased
- P3 and P1 are out
P5[O4]: why E biased
- P1 is in, O4 is out
O6[P5]: BoP (¬E biased, P ) since only experts proven to be
unbiased can be trusted.
- P5 and P1 are out, O4 is in
P7[O6]: why only experts proven to be unbiased can be
trusted.
- O6 is out, P1 is in
O8[P7]: why ¬ only experts proven to be unbiased can be
trusted.
- P7 is out, O6 is in, P1 is out
P9[O8] ¬ only experts proven to be unbiased can be trusted
since experts may be presumed to be unbiased.
- O6 is out, P1 is in
O10[P7]: retract only experts proven to be unbiased can be
trusted.
- O6 is definitively out, P1 is in
O11[P5]: E is biased since his previous research was paid by
the company he testifies for.
- O11 is in, P5 and P1 are out
P12[O11]: concede E is biased.
- O11 is definitely in, P5 and P1 are out
P13[O2]: retract C
- P1 is definitively out
At this point P remains to move but has no legal moves
any more since P1 is definitively out, so the dialogue termi-
nates with a loss for P . Apparently, the proponent could
not find another argument for his initial claim C and there-
fore retracted it. As for the dialogue levels, at O6 the dia-
logue jumps from level 1 to level 2. Consequently, after O6
no replies to moves before O6 are allowed until the level-2
dialogue is ’terminated’. This happens at O10, when O re-
tracts the only premise of his BoP argument, thus making
O6 definitively out so that no reply to any level-2 move can
change the status of P1 anymore. So after O10 the dialogue
Figure 5: The theory in Los Gatos after P5.
jumps back to level 1 so that new replies to moves before O6
are allowed. This explains why O can reply at O11 to P5.
5.2 The Los Gatos case: generalisations
Next we reconstruct the BoP debate from the Los Gatos
case in our system.
P1: claim dismissal-void
- P1 is in
O2[P1]: why dismissal-void
- P1 is out, O2 is in
P3[O2]: dismissal-void since ¬ pressing-ground
- O2 is out, P1 is in
O4[P3]: why ¬ pressing-ground
- P3 and P1 are out
P5[O4]: ¬ pressing-ground since ¬ heard
- O4 is out, P1 is in.
O6[P5]: why good-reason-for-refusal
- P5 and P1 are out.
P7[O6]: why ¬ good-reason-for-refusal
- P1 is in, O6 is out
O8[P7]: BoP (good-reason-for-refusal, P ) since plaintiff must
prove his main claim.
- P7 and P1 are out, O6 is in
P9[O8]: BoP (¬ good-reason-for-refusal, O) since employer
made expressing reasons for refusal impossible.
- O8 is out, P1 is in
O10[P9]: concede BoP (¬ good-reason-for-refusal, O).
- P9 is definitely in, O8 is definitely out, P1 is in
At this point, the BoP-dialogue that started with O8 has ter-
minated, so that level-1 moves can be replied-to again. All of
P ’s moves except P9 are a relevant target for O. Opponent
can fulfil his newly incurred burden of proof by attacking P5
with a ¬ good-reason-for-refusal since Q move.
We next illustrate how during this dialogue implicitly a
dialectical theory of the case is built and reshaped. Figure 5
depicts the theory after move P5. It consists of a single two-
step argument constructed by proponent in his first three
moves. Figure 6 depicts the theory as modified by opponent
with O6. It still contains a single two-step argument but
the interpretation rule for no pressing ground has received
an additional condition and the argument has received a
Figure 7: The theory in Los Gatos after P7.
Figure 6: The theory in Los Gatos after O6.
corresponding third premise. Finally, Figure 7 shows how
proponent has modified his initial theory in an alternative
way. The condition good reason for refusal that was added
by O6 is now negated and has become the condition of an
exceptional rule for pressing ground .
5.3 The school tuition case: mere presump-
tions
We end with formalising the school tuition example, which
illustrates BoP-debates involving mere presumptions. Be-
low we list a dialogue as it could have taken place in this
case (the case summary does not contain enough detail to
reconstruct an actual dialogue).
P1: claim district should pay
- P1 is in
O2[P1]: why district should pay
- P1 is out, O2 is in
P3[O2]: district should pay since the IEP is inappropriate
and if IEP the is inappropriate then it denies free appropri-
ate public education.
- O2 is out, P1 is in
O4[P3]: why the IEP is inappropriate
- P1 is out
P5[O4]: BoP (the IEP is appropriate, O)
- O4 is out, P1 is in
O6[P5]: why BoP (the IEP is appropriate, O)
- P1 is out
P7[O6]: BoP (the IEP is appropriate, O) since district can
better assess IEP and district has obligation to provide ed-
ucation programme.
- O6 is out, P1 is in
O8[P7]: BoP (the IEP is inappropriate, P ) since deciding
otherwise violates the policy of the relevant law to rely on
the professional expertise of the local educators.
- P1 is out
P9[O8]: retract BoP (the IEP is appropriate, O)
- P5 is definitely out, P1 remains out.
P10[O4] the IEP is inappropriate since . . .
P9 makes the initial move of the BoP-dialogue definitely
out, so that no move in the BoP dialogue is a relevant tar-
get; because of this, P can jump back to level 1 and continue
the dialogue about his main claim. Note that if opponent
had conceded P5 at O8, then opponent would have needed
to provide an argument for ‘the IEP is appropriate’ in reply
to P3; such an argument is an example of a premise attack.
The notion of a premise attack is crucial in capturing shifts
in the burden of proof concerning mere presumptions.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed a formal dialogue game
for persuasion dialogues in which the burden of proof can
become the topic of dispute. We have shown with some ex-
amples how our model can handle several kinds of situations,
viz. situations arising from disagreement on the precise form
of defeasible rules and situations where the issue is whether
a proposition or its negation must be presumed true.
It has been noted before that the notion of burden of proof
is related to nonmonotonic reasoning (cf. e.g. [16]). This
paper has shed more light on this relation. In particular,
the reasoning modelled in this paper conceptually precedes
nonmonotonic reasoning. That kind of reasoning needs a di-
vision into general rules and exceptions as input before the
nonmonotonic inference machinery can be applied. For ex-
ample, Verheij [17], when distinguishing various logical roles
of critical questions of argumentation schemes, defines these
roles in terms of a given distinction between conditions of
and exceptions to a scheme. Dialogues about the burden of
proof, by contrast, often have such a division as (implicit)
output since they are often implicitly about whether some-
thing is a condition of or an exception to a general rule.
We have seen that an explicit dialogue often has implicit
elements. Sometimes these implicit elements are about the
allocation of the burden of proof, sometimes about the pre-
cise form of a rule used in an argument and sometimes about
both. This is a very frequent situation; in reality dialogues
rarely make everything that is relevant explicit. Therefore
inferring implicit elements from explicit elements of a dia-
logue is a very important research topic. However, in the
present paper we have refrained from including this in our
formal model since we believe this is a very intricate issue
which deserves detailed study in its own right. As for the
implicit elements of BoP dialogues we currently see two ways
to formally capture them. One is to define implicit commit-
ments of explicit moves. For instance, a why p move could
be regarded as committing the speaker to BoP (p). Another
is to allow that explicit dialogues have associated implicit
dialogues. In this approach a why p move could be regarded
as also making an implicit claim BoP (p) move. We leave
the investigation of these two approaches for future research.
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